Contentious performances: The case of street demonstrations by Klandermans, P.G. & van Stekelenburg, J.
VU Research Portal
Contentious performances: The case of street demonstrations
Klandermans, P.G.; van Stekelenburg, J.
published in
A propósito de Tilly: Conflicto, Poder y Acción Colectiva
2011
Link to publication in VU Research Portal
citation for published version (APA)
Klandermans, P. G., & van Stekelenburg, J. (2011). Contentious performances: The case of street
demonstrations. In M. J. Funes (Ed.), A propósito de Tilly: Conflicto, Poder y Acción Colectiva (pp. 179-222).
Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas.
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
            • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
            • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
            • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal ?
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
E-mail address:
vuresearchportal.ub@vu.nl
Download date: 27. May. 2021





Jacquelien van Stekelenburg 
VU University 
Faculty of Social Sciences 
Dept of Sociology 
 
6.946 words (incl. refs but without tables and figures) 
Abstract (152 words) 
Street demonstrations are among the most frequently performed forms of collective 
action. Tilly has argued that such contentious performances obey the rules of strong 
repertoires. Participants in contentious performances are enacting available scripts 
within which they innovate, but mostly in small ways. As a consequence, street 
demonstrations are the same and different every time they occur. We present 
findings from a comparative study of the demonstrations at the 15 of February 2003 
against the war in Iraq in eight different countries. We furthermore present a 
theoretical model to account for the similarities, variations and changes. Contextual 
variation is conceptualized in terms of the demand and supply-side of protest and 
mobilization as the dynamic that brings demand and supply together. Instrumental, 
identity, and ideological motivation and emotions are proposed as the dynamics of 
participation. To be tested, such a theory requires comparative research; therefore 
we wholeheartedly second Tilly’s call for more comparative research. 
On the 6th of June 2006 hundreds of thousands of people took it to the streets of 
Madrid to demonstrate against the Spanish government’s plans to negotiate with 
ETA. In an attempt to understand why people were taking part in the demonstration 
colleagues of us from the University of Santiago de Compostela interviewed over 
400 participants in the demonstration. Our colleagues soon figured that the reasons 
why people took part were more complicated than one would be inclined to believe 
on the basis of the issue of the demonstration. This became clear when it was taken 
into account with which political party participants identified—the Partido Popular 
(PP) or the Partido Socialista Obrero Espanol (PSOE)—and to what extent they 
identified with the AVT (Asociación de Víctimas del Terrorismo/Terrorist Victims 
Association) that was organizing the demonstration. To be sure, many 
demonstrators identified strongly with the AVT and this explained why they were 
taking part in the demonstration even if they were supporters of the PSOE (the party 
that was in government). However, quite some demonstrators did not so much 
identify with AVT but identified strongly with the PP (the party that not long before 
unexpectedly lost the elections in the wake of the bomb-attacks on the trains in 
Madrid). In fact, these people were not so much demonstrating against the 
negotiations as such, but rather more generally against the PSOE government which 
they accused of having ‘stolen’ their elections. Their answers to other parts of the 
interview confirmed this assumption. Indeed, one could argue, that when a 
demonstration grows that big, it concerns more than the focal issue and addresses 
also more general dissatisfaction with the government in office. For this assumption 
to be tested one should compare demonstrations over issues, time and place; 
research that hardly exists. In this chapter we will unfold a theoretical model that 
we developed for such research to be undertaken. We developed the model in the 
context of a large scale comparative study among participants in demonstrations in 
seven—possibly more—countries in the three years to come. We will illustrate our 
exposé with results from research on demonstrations we have conducted over the 
past years. 
 
This chapter, its subject, and its title are a tribute to Charles Tilly. ‘Contentious 
Performances’ is the title of Tilly’s last book, which appeared in 2008 after he died. 
Contentious performances are contentious because they concern claims that bore on 
someone else’s interests and or values—often governments; they are performances 
because they follow some learned and historically grounded scripts, but like any 
performance there is room for innovation, mostly in small ways. Such performances, 
Tilly argues, clump into repertoires of claim-making routines that apply to the same 
claimant-object pairs: workers tend to strike against their bosses, citizens tend to march 
against their governments, and anti-globalists tend protest against meetings of 
transnational organizations. Repertoires vary from place to place, time to time, and pair to 
pair. Moreover, when people make claims they innovate within limits set by the 
repertoire already established for its specific place, time, and pair. Repertoires vary in 
terms of their rigidity from absence of any repertoire to rigid repertoires that repeat the 
same routines over and over as exactly as they can. Tilly holds that overwhelmingly 
public collective contention involves strong repertoires: “participants in contention are 
enacting available scripts within which they innovate, mostly in small ways” (p. 15). He 
urges us to construct catalogues of performances and their characteristics and to engage 
in comparative studies in order to understand variation and change in performances. 
Contentious Performances is Tilly’s attempt to document what he and others have found 
in terms of variation from setting to setting, from issue to issue, from time to time, and in 
terms of the factors that control such variations and changes. The political context is one 
of those settings. The book sketches contextual variation in three main ways: between 
regimes; within regimes, between political opportunity structures; and within political 
opportunity structures, between the strategic situations faced by different claim-making 
actors.  
 
Street demonstrations are examples of contentious performances. Tilly positions the 
origin of the street demonstration in Great Britain between 1758 and 1834. It became the 
performance staged by social movements; it soon became a multi-purpose tool rather than 
an instrument oriented to some single goal or political inclination. By the 1830s British 
activists had learned to mount all three variants of the street demonstration that are still 
familiar today: the march through public streets, the occupation of a public space for a 
gathering, and the combination of the two in a march to or from the meeting space. 
Roughly hundred year later street demonstrations made it to France to become the major 
means of advertising political identities and programs in France after World War I. In the 
last two decades of the 20th century the number of demonstrations in Paris alone 
increased from 200-400 per annum to 1.000-1.500 per annum. 
 
The question we personally have been working on all along is why individuals end 
up participating in collective action; a question Tilly never bothered to answer. He 
was much more interested in big structures and grand processes. Yet, there would 
be no contentious performances altogether if no individual citizen would decide to 
take part in it. With an international team of sociologists, political scientists, and 
social psychologists we designed a study that Tilly nonetheless would have 
appreciated1. In the U.S. and in six European countries cf. the Netherlands, 
Belgium, Sweden, Switzerland, Spain, and the U.K. we will go out to interview 
people in the act of demonstrating. We will try to understand how characteristics of 
nations, mobilizing contexts, and demonstrations influence who participates, why 
people participate, and how participants were mobilized. 
 
 
Against the war in Iraq 
But before we embark on this endeavor, we take you seven years back. Saturday 15 
February 2003, over 20 million people in more than 600 cities spread over more 
than 60 countries, and over all continents demonstrated against the imminent war in 
Iraq. Social scientists in eight Western countries coordinated by Stefaan Walgrave 
seized the opportunity to design and conduct the first comparative study of street 
demonstrations ever (see Walgrave & Rucht, 2010). In Madrid, Rome, London, 
Glasgow, Brussels, Amsterdam, Berlin, Bern, New York, San Francisco, and 
Seattle interviewers went to the demonstrations, interviewed participants, and 
distributed survey questionnaires to be filled in and returned to the university. Close 
                                                 
1 ‘Caught in the act of protest: Contextualizing Contestation’, www.protestsurvey.eu 
to 6.000 people took part in our study, making for the largest study of street 
demonstrations in history. A demonstration against the same war, at the same day, 
meant a unique opportunity to compare. As the performances were the same, but the 
context varied, we could assess the impact of such variation. Were the participants 
in the eight countries different, and if so were these differences attributable to 
national differences or different mobilizing contexts?  
 
Let’s have a look at some of the results. Not so surprising, the participants in the 
eight demonstrations were very similar as far as their opposition to the war was 
concerned (Table 1). After all, they were all demonstrating against the same 
imminent war in Iraq. But, note the huge differences in dissatisfaction with their 
government’s efforts to prevent the war between the first five countries in the table 
and the last three: very high levels of dissatisfaction for the former and high levels 
of satisfaction for the latter. This again is understandable as the U.S. and the U.K. 
were about to go at war with the support of Spain, Italy and the Netherlands, while 
the  governments of Belgium, Switzerland, and Germany had declared to be 




The functioning of democracy. These two opinions relate, obviously, to the focal 
issues of the demonstration, but there is more. Look at the last row in Table 1. We 
asked everybody how satisfied they were with the functioning of democracy in their 
country. There appear to be three groups: on the one hand, demonstrators in the 
U.S. and Italy who are extremely dissatisfied, and on the other hand, demonstrators 
in the Netherlands, Switzerland, and Belgium who are on average moderately 
satisfied, and demonstrators in Spain and Germany who occupy a position in 
between. Remember what we said at the start with regard to the ETA-protest; if 
demonstrations grow big there is more than just the focal issue that mobilizes 
people. This becomes clearer if we look at the next table (Table 2). In this table we 
compare dissatisfaction with democracy as displayed in 2003 by our respondents 
with dissatisfaction with democracy observed in the years 2001 and 2004 among 
random samples of citizens in the same countries. In this and the next table the 
U.S.A. and Switzerland are missing because we have no comparable data of the 




Comparing discrepancies between demonstrators and average citizens creates two 
groups of three countries each: the UK, Spain and Italy, on the one hand, with 
relatively large discrepancies and the Netherlands, Belgium, and Germany on the 
other, with relatively modest discrepancies. Importantly, the levels of mobilization 
in the first group are significantly higher than that in the latter, as revealed in the 
last row in Table 2. The bottom row shows the mobilization level of the six 
countries; the dichotomy in terms of satisfaction with the functioning of democracy 
is strikingly reproduced in terms of the corresponding mobilization level: the higher 
the discrepancy the higher the turnout. The question is whether this is a real or a 
spurious correlation. One could argue that the opposition to war was very strong in 
Italy and Spain and that the mobilization levels in those two countries therefore 
were high, but opposition was strong in Belgium as well but turnout was lower, 
while negative attitudes towards war among the populace in the UK was of the 
same level as that in the Netherlands and Germany where turnout was significantly 
lower (see footnote 2 for the sources of this and the next figures). One could also 
argue that the level of dissatisfaction with the national government’s efforts to 
prevent war was very high in the UK, Spain, and Italy, but it was high in the 
Netherlands too. Finally, one could argue that the discrepancy in Belgium was so 
low because the Belgian government was against the war, but the German 
government was against the war as well and the Dutch government was not. These 
and other considerations are addressed in Table 3. This table presents multiple 
regression analyses with the mobilization level of a country as the dependent 





The number of cases in this analysis is very small; hence, we must be cautious 
regarding the interpretations and conclusions. Yet, the pattern is consistent and 
allows for a clear conclusion. The differences in mobilization level between the six 
countries in the analysis can be nearly completely accounted for by the combined 
influence of opposition to war and dissatisfaction about the functioning of 
democracy. Note, that it is the discrepancy rather than the absolute level of 
dissatisfaction that makes the difference. Compared to countries with relatively low 
levels of mobilization countries with relatively high levels of mobilization had 
much larger proportions of participants who were more dissatisfied about how 
democracy works in their country than the average citizen. Note also, that being 
more dissatisfied with the functioning of democracy rather than satisfied with the 
government’s efforts to prevent war is what accounts for the different mobilization 
levels. Indeed, the lowering of the beta coefficient in Models 2 and 3 suggests that 
dissatisfaction with the government’s efforts feeds into the more general 
dissatisfaction about the functioning of democracy. In its turn, this more general 
dissatisfaction made the level of mobilization increase. Obviously, what drives 
these people is not only discontent about their government’s policy towards the war, 
but also deeper dissatisfaction about politics in their own country.  
 
Social embeddedness, In yet another manner the countries differ. A movement’s 
mobilization potential is not a collection of isolated individuals, nor is it isolated 
from other parts of society. Individuals are embedded in networks, and members of 
organizations, which in turn are embedded in multi-organizational fields. A 
movement’s mobilization potential can be described in terms of the social capital 
accumulated in it. Lin (1999, p.35) defined social capital as “resources embedded in 
a social structure which are accessed and/or mobilized in purposive actions.” 
Paxton (2002) argued that associational life accumulates social capital, which 
“provides space for the creation and dissemination of discourse critical of the 
present government, and it provides a way for active opposition to the regime to 
grow.” (p. 257). Part of the infra-structure of a movement’s mobilization potential is 
the networks that connect individuals. Weak and strong ties and open and closed 
communication channels weave a web of connections that influences how easy or 
difficult it is to reach a movement’s mobilization potential. Strong ties are direct 
links with other people which are frequently employed; weak ties are indirect 
links—knowing somebody who knows someone else. Strong ties are more 
influential but do not reach beyond someone’s inner circle; weak ties reaches 
farther, but are less influential. Closed communication channels have a restricted 
audience—only the members of an organization or the subscribers to a magazine, 
etc. Open communication channels have no such restrictions; mass media like 
newspapers, radio, or television are open to everybody. Open channels reach more 




What about the participants in the antiwar demonstrations; how well were they 
connected to the mobilizing structure of the respective protest movements and what 
did that mean in terms of their mobilization? The first row in Table 4 shows, that 
many participants in the demonstrations had no ties to organizations that staged the 
demonstrations and that the countries differ in that respect: whereas in the U.S., the 
U.K., the Netherlands, and Germany around 60% of the participants reported to 
have no ties to the organizations that staged the demonstration; this was the case for 
half of the participants in Switzerland and Belgium, and 45% of the participants in 
Spain. In Spain on the other hand a large proportion reported to have weak or 
moderate ties. Strong ties were especially prominent in the Netherlands, 
Switzerland and Belgium.2 In the absence of ties, mass media were important in the 
Netherlands, Spain, and Germany; and interpersonal channels in the U.S., the U.K., 
and Switzerland. Strong ties and closed channels were relatively important in 




Apparently, the structures that facilitated people’s mobilization for the 
demonstration varied for the eight countries. We investigated whether differences in 
the mobilizing structure could be linked to contextual variation. The contextual 
variation in a country can be described in terms of demand, supply, and 
mobilization (Klandermans 2004). The demand-side of protest refers to 
characteristics of the potential of protestors (the mobilization potential) in a society; 
the supply-side refers to the characteristics of the social movement sector in a 
society; mobilization refers to the techniques and mechanisms employed to bring 
demand and supply together (Klandermans 2004). Contextual variation can be 
described in terms of demand and supply factors. Demand factors concern 
                                                 
2 Italy is missing in this and the following tables as the Italian team employed a sampling strategy that makes these 
results in Italy difficult to compare to that of the other countries. 
characteristics of the mobilization potential of a movement, that is the proportion of 
the population that sympathizes with the movement’s cause. The most obvious 
demand factor to include in our design is the opposition to the war in the public 
opinion in the seven countries. Supply factors concern characteristics of the social 
movement sector in a country. We included two supply factors in our analyses: the 
density of the movement sector as indicated by new social movement activity, 
union membership, party membership, and the contentiousness of the movement 
sector as evidenced by demonstration culture and strike activity in a country3 (Table 
6). These indicators were simply correlated with our two aspects of the mobilizing 




Because the number of cases is very small (N=7), coefficients have to be very high to be 
significant. Therefore, we use a lower significance threshold than usual. We found support 
for our assumption that mobilization patterns are affected by demand and supply factors. 
Indeed, open mobilization patterns tend to be more successful in countries where the 
opposition to the war was stronger: participants in those countries were more often 
mobilized via open channels. Furthermore, and also as expected, the denser the movement 
sector was in a country, the more closed were patterns of mobilization. Interestingly, in the 
case new social movements mobilized for action, this was reflected in the mobilization 
channels used: weaker ties combined with closed communication channels. Whereas in the 
case of union and party membership it reflected more in the significance of strong ties for 
mobilization. Finally, if the movement sector in a country was more contentious, 
mobilization for the Iraq demonstration tended to increasingly work via open mobilization 
channels.  
In practice, demand and supply interact in determining mobilization processes: high levels 
of demand and a contentious social movement sector make for open mobilization patterns 
(open channels, weak ties). Spain, Germany, and the Netherlands seem to follow that 
pattern. A dense social movement sector and relatively low levels of demand make 
mobilization patterns more closed (closed channels, strong ties). Belgium and Switzerland 
lean in that direction. But, as the level of demand rises, open mobilisation practices can be 
succesful too.  
 
 
The dynamics of contention 
Grievances, mobilization levels, and mobilizing structure all vary across the 
countries in our study. These results demonstrate how much of a difference 
                                                 
3 The degree of opposition to war in public opinion is based on the EOS Gallup poll on the war carried out in Europe just 
before February 15. General activity levels of new social movements in countries is derived from the European Social  
Survey (no data on the US nor on Switzerland) asking for participation in an activity of a humanitarian or a 
environmental/peace organization during the last 12 months. Figures for general union membership are derived from the 
World Labour Report 1997-1998 of the International Labour Organization (www.ilo.org). General demonstration culture 
in a country is based on the World Values Studies answers on questions about participation in a lawful demonstration. 
Strike activity levels are based on figures of the ILO, taking the yearly average of the absolute number of demonstrations 
recorded in a country between 1998 and 2003 divided by the population size. General partisan membership in a country 
is based on Peter Mair and Ingrid Van Biezen, 2001, Party membership in twenty European democracies 1998-2000, 
Party Politics, Vol. 7, No. 1. 
contextual factors can make. Indeed, perhaps the most important finding of the Iraq-
study was that the size and composition (who) of the anti-Iraq war demonstrations, 
the motivation (why), and mobilisation (how) of its participants varied strikingly 
between countries. Covering street demonstrations that were staged at the same 
time and concerned identical issues we found remarkable differences between 
nations. Mobilisation campaigns, coalitions, turnout, and attitudes of the individual 
protesters all varied. If this holds for the same street demonstration, differences will 
be even larger for different street demonstrations, as demonstrated by Walgrave and 
Verhulst (2010) in a comparison of demonstrations in Belgium. Hence, we know 
that the same demonstration in different countries and different demonstrations in 
the same country produce diverging dynamics of protest. Yet, systematic 
knowledge of how protest demonstrations vary and how that variation is influenced 
by contextual variation is largely lacking. Indeed, we still do not know how the 
diverse levels―national socio-political context and mobilising context―influence 
who protests, why they do so and how they are mobilised. To be sure, participants 
in individual demonstrations have been subject of investigation; hence, we might 
know who took part in a specific demonstration and why and how they were 
mobilized, but whether the participants in various demonstrations in the same 
country, or the same demonstration in various countries differ, we hardly know; nor 
do we know much about the extent to which the composition of the participants and 
their motives change during the life course of a movement and what causes this 
variation. In short, we must study the context in which demonstrations are staged 
and learn how contextual differences and changes impact on who participates for 
what reasons, and how s/he was mobilized. We assume that the following 
contextual factors influence the characteristics of the protestors: (1) nation, i.e. the 
national political system in which demonstrations are staged; (2) mobilizing context, 
i.e. the demand and supply-side of protest, and the techniques of mobilization; and 
(3) demonstration, i.e. the characteristics of the demonstration. Our central tenet is 
that a specific national context generates a specific mobilizing context; that the 
interaction of nation and mobilizing context produces a specific type of 
demonstration; that a specific type of demonstration brings a specific group of 
protestors into the streets. We assume that the composition of the group of 
protestors, their motives and the way they are mobilized result from the interaction 
of national context, mobilizing context, and type of demonstration. This is what 
Figure 1 displays. The following paragraphs offer a short elaboration of the key-
elements of the model. 
 
Figure 1  
 
Nations  
Nations vary in terms of the circumstances they create for political protest. The political 
opportunity structure, the openness of the political system for challengers, the access 
points available for people to defend their interests and express their opinions, the 
temporal political configuration, are all identified as determinants of the incidence and 
type of protest (Kriesi 2004; Tarrow 1998; Koopmans 1999; Tilly 2008). Dynamics of 
protest are shaped by socio-political characteristicss of a country (see Koopmans et al. 
2005). In open political systems, such as for instance The Netherlands, there is space for 
negotiation whereas in closed political systems, for instance France, this is much less so. 
This may imply that the French are more motivated to participate in protest than the 
Dutch and that the protest cultures in the two countries differ. In the Netherlands protest 
demonstrations are rare, in France they have become the most frequently employed form 
of contention. It may also imply that protest issue in France more often than in the 
Netherlands become matters of principle rather than interests. More generally, the public 
mood (Rahn 2004) in a country might influence the way problems are framed, which 
emotions are experienced and what the participation motives are. Problems framed in 
terms of violated principles, for instance, induce a state of indignation whereas problems 
framed in violated interests lead to anger (Elster, 1996).  
 
Mobilizing contexts  
As mentioned previously, the mobilizing context in a country can be described in 
terms of demand, supply, and mobilization (Klandermans 2004). We propose that 
the interaction of demand, supply and mobilization influences the dynamics of 
protest participation.  
 
Demand. A demand for protest begins with levels of grievances in a society 
(Klandermans 1997). For grievances to become the focus of collective action the 
people involved must develop a politicized collective identity. In the course of the 
process of politicization the awareness that grievances are shared develops, 
adversarial framing defines who the opponents are, and attempts are made to 
mobilize third parties or public support. More and more population groups employ 
protest as a mean to communicate their grievances (Klandermans, 2001; Meyer and 
Tarrow 1998). At the same time, migration has made Western societies more 
diverse (Koopmans, Statham, Giugni, and Passy 2005). Grievances globalize as 
well, depicted by a growing consciousness of issues such as global justice or a 
shared concern for the climate. All in all, more diverse constituencies with more 
diverse grievances, are more often opting for protest to communicate their 
grievances and ventilate their anger. 
 
Supply. The supply-side of protest concerns the characteristics of the social 
movement sector in a society, its strength, its diversity, its contentiousness. The 
movement sector, however, does not exist in a vacuum, it is embedded in a multi-
organizational field consisting of potential allies and opponents. As the conflict 
intensifies, increasingly actors in the organizational field are challenged to take 
sides. Traditionally, the social movement sector is conceived of as a conglomerate 
of movement organizations (McAdam et al. 1996: 3), which provides the more or 
less formalized infrastructure on which protest is built (McAdam 1988; McCarthy 
and Zald 1976; Diani and McAdam 2003). Increasingly, however, we see protest 
participation rooted in everyday networks of participants and social movement 
actors involved in diffuse and decentralized networks (Duyvendak and Hurenkamp 
2004; Melucci 1996; Taylor 2000). At the same time, enhanced ethnic diversity has 
created ethnically diverge social capital (Fennema & Tillie 2008). Finally, we see 
the emergence of ‘global social movement sectors’ (Smith & Fetner 2007). Hence, 
nowadays the more diverse traditional formal organizations supply protest 
opportunities are more and more supplemented by more loosely coupled mobilizing 
structures. 
 
Mobilization. Mobilization is a process that proceeds in analytically distinguishable 
steps. Klandermans (1984) makes the distinction between consensus mobilization 
and action mobilization. Consensus mobilization concerns the deliberate 
dissemination of the movement’s viewpoints. The process of consensus 
mobilization has been elaborated much further by Snow and colleagues (Snow et al. 
1986) into what is now known as frame alignment. Action mobilization transforms 
sympathizers into participants. Klandermans and Oegema (1987) have elaborated 
the process of action mobilization and broke it down into their four steps model to 
participation. Citizens must become sympathizers (consensus mobilization); 
sympathizers must be targeted so that they know about the upcoming event; 
sympathizers must be motivated to take part; motivated sufficiently to surmount the 
remaining barriers to participation.  
Processes of mobilization bring a demand for protest together with a supply 
of protest opportunities. Globalization, the development of network society and 
information society has changed mobilization techniques radically. New 
information and communication technologies (ICTs) such as the Internet, e-mail, 
MySpace, MSN, cell phones have changed the ways in which activists 
communicate and mobilize. Traditional organizations seem to rely more on 
information channels such as flyers, and organizational publications targeting their 
members whereas, in networks the channels employed are face-to-face, Internet, 
online social networks, and cell phones.  
At a general level, demand, supply, and mobilization are supposedly shaped 
by national context. At a specific level, mobilizing context is further colored by 
characteristics of the demonstration, especially the issue. Little is known about the 
way mobilizing contexts vary, how such variation is determined, or how it impacts 
on the characteristics of a demonstration.  
 
Demonstrations  
First and foremost, demonstrations vary in terms of the issue. In his dissertation, 
Verhulst (2010) proposes a distinction between ‘old’, ‘new’, and ‘consensual’ 
issues. Old issues are typical socio-economic issues, such as inequality, social 
security, industrial conflicts. Usually, they come with a network of formal, 
traditional organizations that stage the demonstration. New issues are more moral, 
cultural, life style kind of issues such as gender, GLTB, pro-life, pro choice, animal 
rights and peace an anti war movements. More frequently loosely coupled networks 
are engaged in the process of mobilization for demonstration regarding such issues. 
Consensual issues are issues that encounter massive support, such as the movement 
against drunken driving or marches against random violence. Such issues that meet 
broad support need very little in terms of organization to bring large numbers onto 
the street. 
Furthermore, demonstrations can be ritualized, peaceful, or violent; with or 
without permit; with or without close consultation with the police. Demonstrations 
are usually staged by a coalition of organizers, but the composition of the coalition 
varies and depending on the coalition the composition of the crowd in streets varies. 
For example, the coalition that organized the demonstration against the war in Iraq 
in Spain consisted of major political and social organizations, while that in the 
Netherlands consisted of small leftist organizations. As a consequence the 
composition of the crowds demonstrating in the two countries differed significantly. 
The location and the weather conditions vary and so does the media coverage. As 
we are lacking systematic comparisons it is difficult to say how these variations 
impact on protest participation. Obviously, the populations demonstrating differ in 
size and composition but how this relates to characteristics of the demonstration is 
far from clear. 
 
Protesters  
The last step in our model of the dynamics of contention concerns the protestors. 
Who are they and why do they take part? Also the motivation of protestors is 
context dependent. The type of demonstration, the interaction of demand, supply, 
and mobilization, and the national context influence the participants’ motivation. 
We conceive of motivation in terms of identity, grievances and emotions. 
Identities, grievances and emotions. Social psychologists propose identity, 
grievances and emotions as mechanisms that help to understand why some people 
are motivated to take part in demonstrations while others aren’t. Note, that 
motivation is not all there is. Remember that motivation is only one of the four 
steps to participation. Nonetheless, here our focus is on motivation. Strikingly, a 
comprehensive framework integrating identity, grievances, and emotions into a 
single model was lacking. We have been working on such a model over the past 
few years (Van Stekelenburg et al. 2009a and 2009b). The model we developed and 
began to test assigns a central, integrating role to processes of identification. In 
order to develop the shared grievances and shared emotions that characterize a 




The dependent variable of the model (the strength of the motivation to participate in 
collective action) results from emotions, and grievances shared with a group that the 
individual participants identify with. Grievances supposedly originate from interests 
and/or principles that are felt to be threatened. The more people feel that interests of 
the group and/or principles that the group values are threatened, the angrier they are 
and the more they are prepared to take part in collective action to protect their 
interests and/or to express their anger.  
 The emphasis in the motivational configuration can be more instrumental—
people participate because they belief that this might make a difference; 
ideological—people participate because they feel the moral obligation to express 
their view; or identity driven—people participate because they feel the social 
obligation to stand by the people they identify with. Emotions amplify and 
accelerate. The angrier people are the more likely that they will engage on political 
protest. 
Recent work on multiple identities (cf Kurtz 2002) shows that the various 
identities people simultaneously hold, may come into conflict and guide behavior in 
different directions. People might find themselves under cross-pressure (Oegema 
and Klandermans 1994) when two of the groups they identify with end up on 
opposite sides of a controversy (for example, union members who are faced with 
the decision to strike against their own company). Indeed, workers who go on strike 
or movement activists who challenge their government are often accused of being 
disloyal to the company or the country. González and Brown (2003) coined the 
term ‘dual identity’ to point to the concurrent workings of identities. These authors 
argued that identification with a subordinate entity (e.g. ethnic identity) does not 
necessarily exclude identification with a supraordinate entity (e.g. national identity). 
In fact, they claim that a so-called ‘dual identity’ is the desirable configuration, as it 
implies having sufficient identification with one’s primary group to experience 
basic security and sufficient identification with the overarching group to preclude 
divisiveness (see also Huo et al. 1996). Studies among Spanish and Dutch farmers, 
among South African citizens, and immigrants in the Netherlands and New York 
(Klandermans et al. 2001, 2004, 2008) suggest that holding a dual identity 
stimulates subgroup mobilization, suggesting that some degree of identification 
with the nation is needed in order to mobilize for political action. Indeed our study 
among Turkish and Moroccan immigrants in Amsterdam and New York revealed 
that immigrants holding a dual identity—that is identifying both with their ethnic 
group and their society of residence—were more satisfied with their situation. 
However, if they were dissatisfied, they were more likely to take part in collective 




Street demonstrations are among the most frequently performed forms of collective 
action. There is no single day without reports in the newspapers of demonstrations 
somewhere in the world—be it Iran, Thailand, Indonesia, Bolivia, Venezuela, 
France or Spain. Tilly has argued that such contentious performances obey the rules 
of strong repertoires. Participants in contentious performances are enacting 
available scripts within which they innovate, mostly in small ways. As a 
consequence, street demonstrations are the same and different every time. We have 
presented a theoretical model to account for these similarities, variations and 
changes.  
The challenge for students of street demonstrations is to document these 
regularities in change and the variations in contention. This is easier said than done. 
Studies of demonstrations or more general of contentious performances are mostly 
done on single cases. As interesting as this might be, single case studies inevitably 
take all contextual variation away. It is impossible to tell whether these findings are 
typical for this specific country, this specific issue, or this specific demonstration. 
Only by comparing single cases with other cases, we will be able to disentangle the 
general and the unique. Only if we understand the peculiarities of a national 
political, social, and mobilizing context we will be able to make sense of the 
findings in a specific country or a specific demonstration. In order to verify such 
reasoning we need to conduct comparative research; we therefore wholeheartedly 
second Tilly’s call for research—comparing contentious performances over place 
and time.  
 In the concluding chapter of Contentious Performances Tilly reflects on 
how such research can be done. He notes the tension between analysis that seeks to 
explain retrospectively how changes in performances and repertoires occur and 
analysis that seeks to show prospectively how previously existing performances and 
repertoires shape the ways that people make collective contentious claims. He 
proposes to resolve the tension dialectically by confronting and synthesizing the 
two perspectives: 
 
‘Decompose contentious episodes into particular interactions. Detect the sets 
of interactions that comprise different sorts of episodes. Identify the learned 
performances that group certain episodes together. See how performances 
cluster within repertoires and campaigns. Watch how one campaign affects 
the next. Then analyze how incremental change from campaign to campaign 
compounds into larger-scale repertoire change.” (p. 201)’. 
 
He continues to emphasize that systematic study of performances requires close 
description of interaction among participants rather than simple identification and 
counting of whole episodes. He makes the distinction between an epidemiological 
and a narrative approach. The former analyzes counts of contentious events such as 
strikes, street demonstrations, or violent attacks; the latter attempts to reconstruct 
single events as a sequence of actions and interactions. Tilly’s own approach taken 
in Contentious Performances identifies a middle ground between epidemiology and 
narrative: ‘close description of successive interactions within contentious episodes’ 
(p. 206).  
As we are social psychologists, we have tried to translate Tilly’s call to the 
individual level of analysis; offering a theoretical account of what individuals 
decide to do faced with the choice to engage or defect, to take part or quit. Such 
choices we have argued are context dependent as are the social psychological 
dynamics that control the choices. As a consequence, travelling from demonstration 
to demonstration over time and place we expect to observe differences and 
similarities.. Organizers, participants and authorities are surveyed and interviewed 
employing identical instruments and data are collected on the socio-political and 
mobilising context. Collecting data on the micro, meso, and macro level we aim to 
understand the regularities and variations between demonstrations.  
Let us close by citing Tilly’s last paragraph which he features as an agenda 
for new research: 
 
“Students of contentious politics should move away from classified event 
counts and single-episode narratives toward procedures that trace 
interactions among participants in multiple episodes. They should also look 
systematically at how alterations in political opportunities, available models 
for claim making, and connections among potential claimants produce 
changes in performances and repertoires. If the weaknesses of [the approach 
taken in this book] inspire my readers to invent different and superior 
methods for investigating contentious performances, I will cheer them on. 
(Tilly, 2008, p. 211) 
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Table 1 Opinions about war and government 
 US UK SP IT NL SW BE GE Eta2 
Opposition to wara 3.5 3.4 3.7 3.8 3.3 3.6 3.6 3.6 .07
Dissatisfaction with government’s efforts 
to prevent war b 
  4.8     4.5   4.9     4.8   4.5   3.0   2.0   2.4   .68
Satisfaction functioning democracyb 1.8 2.1 2.3 1.5 2.5 2.7 2.6 2.3 .25
N 705 1129 452 1016 542 637 510 781  
Notes: a On a scale from 1 (“completely not opposed”) to 5 (“completely opposed”) 
b On a scale from 1 (“completely satisfied”) to 5 (“completely dissatisfied”) 
Source: International Peace Protest Survey (IPPS) 2003 
   
 
Table 2 Dissatisfaction with the functioning of democracy: percent not satisfied 
 
 UK SP IT NL BE GE 
       
Iraq demonstration survey 70 62 93 40 37 58 
       
Eurobarometer 11-2001 27 30 60 26 31 36 
Eurobarometer 04-2004 34 29 60 33 35 48 
       
Discrepancy with 01b 43 32 33 14 6 22 
Discrepancy with 04b 36 33 33 7 2 10 
       
Mobilization level Iraq demonstrationc 1.6 2.5 2.6 .04 .07 .06 
Notes: a  Percent of respondents who are “not very satisfied” or “not at all satisfied” 
          b Discrepancy between average participant and average citizen in 2001 and 2004 
 c Size of demonstration as proportion of population (%) 
Source: Eurobarometer (2001; 2004); International Peace Protest Survey (IPPS) 2003 
 
Table 3 Level of mobilization and attitudes about the war and national politicsa 
 
 Multiple regression: 
standardized beta’s 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Opposition to war .56 .64** .54* 
Dissatisfaction with government’s policy .43 .27 .25 
Dissatisfaction with functioning of democracy .26   
Discrepancy with Eurobarometer 11-2001  .44**  
Discrepancy with Eurobarometer 04-2004   .48** 
Political efficacy    
N = 6    
Adjusted R2 .85 .98* .99** 
*p < .10; *p < .05 





Table 4 Ties to organizations that stage the demonstration (%) 
 US UK SP NL SW BE GE 
No ties 61,9 62.2 44.9 58.5 49.6 49.5 58.4 
Weak ties  7.6 14.1 33.0 13.3 11.9 13.1 16.0 
Moderate ties 11.2 6.9 15.3 7.1 11.7 12.1 9.0 
Strong ties 5.7 5.3 5.6 6.6 9.6 8.6 5.1 
Very Strong ties 11.5 11.5 1.1 14.5 17.2 16.7 11.5 
N 666 1116 448 528 629 503 769 
Note: a  Chi-square 1086.47, df 28, p<.001 




Table 5 Mobilization patterns (%) 
 
 US UK SP NL SW BE GE 
No ties + …        
  Mass media  15.0 15.7 27.2 25.3 14.1 16.5 24.6 
  Interpersonal channels 23.5 22.6 11.8 17.2 20.9 14.9 18.5 
(Very) strong ties + …        
  Organization, ads, flyers, etc 12.6 10.3 1.5 12.8 13.5 15.4 9.5 
N 666 1116 448 528 629 503 769 
Source: International Peace Protest Survey (IPPS) 2003 
 
 
Table 6 The influence of demand and supply factors on mobilization patterns: (Pearson’s correlations) 
 
 Demand Supply: density of movement sector 














culture Strike activity 
Strength of ties 
 
 




-.53* .57* .33 -.19 -.72** -.43 
* p<.20; ** p<.05.  
Source: International Peace Protest Survey (IPPS) 2003 
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